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CATEGORIES AS MATHEMATICAL MODELS
DAVID I. SPIVAK
Abstract. Category theory is presented as a mathematical modeling framework
that highlights the relationships between objects, rather than the objects in them-
selves. A working definition of model is given, and several examples of mathematical
objects, such as vector spaces, groups, and dynamical systems, are considered as
categorical models.
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Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects. Thus,
they are free to replace some objects by others so long as the relations remain
unchanged. Content to them is irrelevant: they are interested in form only.
– Henri Poincare´
Yet, I hope that I managed to convey the message: the mathematical lan-
guage developed by the end of the 20th century by far exceeds in its expres-
sive power anything, even imaginable, say, before 1960. Any meaningful idea
coming from science can be fully developed in this language.
– Mikhail Gromov
1. Introduction
In the sciences, most of the prominent methods for incorporating mathematics
involve setting up stochastic processes, dynamical systems, or statistical models that
capture the relevant matters in the scientific subject. At bottom, these techniques all
involve interplays of numbers. However, a biologist’s sophisticated understanding of
the complex aspects of life—heredity, reproduction, hierarchical nesting, symbiosis,
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metabolism, etc.—remains trapped in the realm of ideas.1 Such ideas can often be
reduced to numerical models, but the ideas themselves are confined to the background.
This is suboptimal, because when an idea or theory is itself mathematically formalized,
it gains clarity, systematicity, and falsifiability.
My hope for category theory is that it can be used to model many of the ac-
tual ideas and ways of thinking that exist within science. Modeling a phenomenon
allows us to examine, and interact with, a simplified version of it, and involving
mathematics generally provides an additional level of rigor and communicability. A
category-theoretic model of the ideas, rather than of the mere quantities, may be able
to formally capture a whole conceptual framework, say, ideas about the hierarchical
nature of organizational systems. With such a formal description, one could apply
rigorous conceptual—rather than numerical—tests to the ideas themselves. For ex-
ample, one might check whether the ideas satisfy various internal consistencies, or
one might ask about the nature of their integration with the other major conceptual
frameworks that exist in the field.
There is a good deal of work on using category theory to model high-level conceptual
aspects of scientific subjects. For example, categories have been used by John Baez to
model signal flow and reaction networks, by Abramsky and Coecke to model aspects
of quantum mechanics, and by Lambek to model computer programming languages.
I believe that in 2015 we are at the early stages of an effort to “categorify” science.
Category theory holds promise for such a conceptual integration of science because
it has achieved such an integration of mathematics to a remarkable degree. It does
so, not by finding a single syntax or format that can encode any structure, but by
doing the opposite: leaving the encoding entirely absent. Rather than modeling a
given object in itself, category theory models only the relationships between objects.
For example, one may say that some object has an internal structure; however, in the
categorical model this internal structure can only be seen by using other objects as
probes. That is, category theory views an object’s internal structure only in terms of
its relationships with other objects.
My goal in this paper is to give philosophers an intuitive idea about how category
theory can be thought of as a universal modeling language, in which the relationships
between objects are paramount. In particular, it is not my goal to present new
interpretations of established philosophical concepts. At times I invoke philosophical
ideas, e.g., those of Kant, but the reader should keep in mind that these are my
attempt to forge a communication with the philosophical community, rather than
to express substantial claims about Kant’s work. It is also not my goal to explain
exactly how category theory can be used to formalize the more complex ideas found
throughout science. As mentioned above, this kind of work has certainly begun in
1Here, we use biology only as a specific branch of science. Our intention is to consider scientific ideas,
beyond their numerical shadows, as subject to mathematical formalization.
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earnest, but adequately addressing it is beyond the scope of this paper. The discussion
in this paper is somewhat similar in spirit to that of Lawvere and Schanuel’s excellent
introductory book, Conceptual Mathematics, which I recommend for further reading.
1.1. Category theory as modeling language. In this paper I cast category the-
ory (CT) as a universal modeling language. More precisely, I claim that CT is a
mathematical model of mathematical models. Before I explain this assertion, I will
ground the discussion with a prototypical example of a model to fix ideas, and then
I will define what I mean by model.
The sonar system in a submarine models the distances between various objects
in the physical environment of the submarine. It does so by plotting dots, which
correspond to these objects, on a screen using polar coordinates (distance and angle).
A representation of the information gathered by the sonar system is displayed to the
submarine’s pilot in a familiar “self-centric” way, i.e., with the submarine (and hence
the pilot) shown at the center of the display. This allows the sonar system to become
transparent equipment2 for the pilot. In other words, she can seamlessly integrate the
representation into her personal repertoire and thereby use familiar methods to cope
appropriately with a situation as it unfolds, say to evade or pursue another object.
In this example, the sonar system of the submarine is the model and the pilot is
its user. The physical environment of the submarine is the subject of the model; it
is the thing being modeled by the sonar system. Because the locations of objects in
the physical environment are emphasized, rather than suppressed, we say that these
observable aspects of the subject are foregrounded by the model. The distances and
angles between these locations are the relationships between foregrounded aspects.
We refer to the translation, from sound-wave reflectance times to points in a polar
coordinate system, as the formalism that founds the model.
Let us tie these ideas together by making some observations. The value of the sonar
system (the model) is measured by the extent to which the pilot’s (the user’s) inter-
action with submarine’s physical environment (the subject) is successfully mediated
by the sonar system. This in turn depends on the extent to which the locations of
the physical objects in the environment (the foregrounded aspects) are propitious for
successful interaction with the subject and the extent to which the polar coordinate
representation of these objects (the formalism) is faithful.
With this exemplar in mind, we make the following two philosophical postulates,
which will help to organize the ideas in this paper.
(1) Modeling a subject is foregrounding certain observable aspects of the sub-
ject, and then formalizing these aspects and certain observable relationships
between them.
2See Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind.
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(2) The value of a model is measured by the extent to which the user’s interactions
with the subject are successfully mediated by the model. This in turn depends
on the propitiousness of the foregrounded aspects and the faithfulness of the
formalism.
Note that mathematical models seem to put more emphasis on, and care into, the
formalism than do other types of models.
1.2. Using models is connecting models. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Im-
manuel Kant makes an important assertion:
[E]verything intuited or perceived in space and time, and therefore all
objects of a possible experience, are nothing but phenomenal appear-
ances, that is, mere representations, which in the way in which they
are represented to us, as extended beings, or as series of changes, have
no independent, self-subsistent existence apart from our thoughts.
In other words, our interactions with the subject, which is ostensibly out there, are
actually interactions with our own familiar models (or as Kant says, representations)
of it. Our mind is an economy of models and our thinking consists of negotiations
within that economy. Thus the value of a model is measured by the ease with which
it negotiates or interfaces with the other models in our repertoire.
Using models is all about translating between models. To say it another way, the
observable aspects of a model are known only by its relationships with other models.
It follows that, in order to objectively understand our interactions with a model, it is
useful to understand the more general question of how models relate to other models.
We add to our list a third and final philosophical postulate, which will be clarified
throughout the paper:
(3) A model is known only by its relationships with other models.
With our three modeling postulates in hand, we unpack the italicized statement
from Section 1.1, that category theory is a mathematical model of mathematical
modeling. We are claiming, then, that category theory mathematically foregrounds,
and formalizes, certain observable aspects of the subject of mathematical modeling.
To make this claim, we must answer the question, What observable aspect of math-
ematical models does category theory (CT) foreground? The answer is, roughly, that
CT foregrounds a sense in which each mathematical model is known by its relation-
ship with other mathematical models. That is, CT foregrounds the third postulate as
an observable aspect of modeling. It formalizes this postulate in terms of morphisms.
Clarifying the above statements will be the subject of the present paper. I will
explain how notions in pure mathematics, such as vector spaces or groups, can be
viewed as mathematical models, say of linearity or symmetry. I will show how models
of linearity, symmetry, and action are all known by the interactions that exist between
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them. In other words, I am committing to the above description of, and postulates
about, models—exemplified by sonar in submarines—and I will present several canon-
ized mathematical concepts, e.g., vector spaces and groups, as mathematical models.
While many mathematicians would agree with the statement that category theory
is valuable for understanding and working with mathematical subjects, this paper
does not attempt to prove it. However, our second postulate characterizes what such
a statement would mean: the value of category theory should be measured by the
extent to which it successfully mediates our interactions with mathematical models.
If it is valuable, this would imply that category theory foregrounds and faithfully
formalizes a propitious aspect of modeling: namely, that to gainfully use models, it
is useful to be able to translate between them.
1.3. Plan of the paper. Our first goal will be to gently introduce categories in Sec-
tion 2 using what we hope is a familiar mathematical subject, that of matrix arith-
metic. We will then discuss a model of linearity, or flat spaces, in Section 3, where
we will emphasize the categorical perspective, i.e., how the mathematical model of
flat spaces is reflected in (and determined by) the rules defining relationships between
flat spaces. In Section 4, we define the sort of relationship between categories that
captures their structure, namely the functorial relationship. This enables us to con-
sider symmetry and action in Section 5. Finally, we give a few concluding remarks in
Section 6.
Throughout the paper we continually return to our three postulates about model-
ing. In this way, we will be able to view category theory as a mathematical model of
mathematical modeling.
2. Matrices: from groups to enriched categories
Our goal in this section is to introduce category theory by considering the case
of matrix arithmetic. We will see that all the usual issues regarding dimension and
invertibility are actually information about the structure of a category hidden behind
the scenes.
Before we begin, it should be noted that matrices are among the most important
tools in mathematical modeling. For example MATLAB, a highly popular techni-
cal computing program used by engineers of all kinds, is based primarily on matrix
arithmetic. Thus, considering matrices is certainly fair game for thinking about math-
ematical modeling in the usual sense. Note that the problems usually considered in
creating these tools, e.g., speed or accuracy issues, are not being addressed here.
Instead, we are considering the abstract idea of matrices. In Section 2.1 we will fore-
ground some observable aspects of matrix arithmetic, and in Sections 2.3 – 2.5 we
will formalize them category-theoretically. The result will be a category Mat´ˆ´ that
models the subject of matrix arithmetic.
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2.1. Matrices: a review of relevant aspects. A student who is new to linear
algebra must learn a few things regarding when matrices can be added and multiplied,
the properties of additive and multiplicative identity matrices, the issue of invertibility
and non-invertibility, and so on. We now review these because they are precisely what
is encoded in the single fact that matrices form a group-enriched category. That is,
we will introduce category theory by explaining how a certain category models the
subject of matrices.
For any natural numbers m, n P N, let Matmˆn denote the set of mˆn matrices—as
usual, m is the number of rows and n is the number of columns—and let each entry
be a real number. For a matrix M P Matmˆn, we refer to pm, nq as the dimension
of M and denote this fact by dimpMq “ pm, nq. It is well-known that to add two
matrices, say M `P , they must have the same dimension. However, to multiply two
matrices, say MP , there is a different kind of restriction: the middle numbers must
agree. More precisely, if dimpMq “ pm, nq and dimpP q “ pp, qq, we require n “ p in
order for the product MP to make sense. In this case, dimpMP q “ pm, qq.
There is a certain matrix In P Matnˆn, called the nˆn identity matrix, which looks
like this:
In “
»
——————–
1 0 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0
0 1 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0
0 0 1 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 1
fi
ffiffiffiffiffiffifl
(1)
A matrix M is called invertible if there exists some matrix N such that MN “ In
and NM “ In. Not every matrix is invertible; for example a matrix of all 0’s, as seen
below on the left, is not invertible, but neither is the more average-looking matrix on
the right: »
–0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
fi
fl
»
– 1 2 00 2 ´2
´2 ´3 ´1
fi
fl
Note that for any mˆn matrix Q, we have QIn “ Q, and for any nˆ p matrix R we
have InR “ R.
2.2. The group of invertible nˆ n matrix multiplication. Many scientists and
engineers, from physicists modeling the dynamics of elementary particles, to 3D-
animators modeling the changes of camera-angle perspectives on a physical scene,
use (either explicitly or implicitly) a group of invertible n ˆ n matrices as part of
their toolset. That is, group theory is used in mathematical modeling (in the usual
sense). We will see below that group theory is a special case of category theory, and
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we will explain why groups are showing up in the theory of matrix multiplication.
First, however, let us recall what a group is, using matrices as the working example.
Let InvMatn denote the set of all invertible nˆn matrices. Here are the rules that
hold in InvMatn, which make it a group in the sense of abstract algebra.
(1) There is an established multiplication formula for InvMatn. In other words,
every two elements M, N P InvMatn can be multiplied, and the result is again
in the group, i.e., MN P InvMatn.
(2) Multiplying is associative: for any M, N, P P InvMatn, we have pMNqP “
MpNP q.
(3) There is an established identity element in InvMatn. In other words, there is
an element In P InvMatn, such that InM “ M “ MIn for every M P InvMatn.
(4) There is an established inverse operation in InvMatn. In other words, for every
element M , there is an established element N , often denoted N “ M´1, such
that MN “ In “ NM .
These rules encode a notion of symmetry that we will return to later in Section 5.1.
2.3. The monoid of n ˆ n matrix multiplication. Recall that Matnˆn denotes
the set of all nˆ n matrices, including but not limited to the invertible ones. Rather
than being a group, Matnˆn is a monoid. As such, three out of the four rules for
groups, as enumerated above, are true of Matnˆn. Namely,
(1) There is an established multiplication formula for Matnˆn. In other words,
every two elements M, N P Matnˆn can be multiplied, and the result is again
in the monoid, i.e., MN P Matnˆn.
(2) Multiplying is associative: for any M, N, P P Matnˆn, we have pMNqP “
MpNP q.
(3) There is an established identity element in Matnˆn. In other words, there is
an element In P Matnˆn, such that InM “ M “ MIn for every M P Matnˆn.
A monoid is like a group—elements can be multiplied, multiplication is associative,
and there is an identity element—but there is no need for every element of a monoid
to be invertible. Not every matrix is invertible, so if we want to think about n ˆ n
matrix multiplication in full generality, we need to use monoids.
A group is thus a special kind of monoid, one in which every element is invertible.
In the same way, a monoid is a special kind of category, one in which every two
elements can be multiplied. Just as we broadened our view from the set of invertible
matrices (as a group) to the set of all nˆn matrices (as a monoid), it is now time to
further broaden our view to consider all m ˆ n matrices, i.e., matrices that are not
necessarily square. For this we will need a category.
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2.4. The category of matrix multiplication. Let N denote the set of natural
numbers. The set of all matrices forms neither a group nor a monoid, but an N-
category, which we will denote Mat´ˆ´. Read the symbol Mat´ˆ´ as “blank-by-blank
matrices.” In terms of sets, it is the union
Mat´ˆ´ :“
ď
m,nPN
Matmˆn .
The three rules for N-categories are like those for monoids, but with a slight relaxation
in the multiplication rule:3
(1) There is an established multiplication formula for Mat´ˆ´, which is defined
as long as the middle terms agree. In other words, matrices M P Matmˆn and
N P Matpˆq can be multiplied if and only if n “ p, and the result is again in
the category, i.e., MN P Matmˆq.
(2) Multiplying is associative: for any M, N, P P Mat´ˆ´, if MN and NP can
be multiplied then pMNqP “ MpNP q.
(3) For each n P N there is an established identity element in Matnˆn. In other
words, there is an element In P Matnˆn, such that MIn “ M for every M P
Matmˆn and InN “ N for every N P Matnˆq.
Let’s consider each dimension n P N to be a kind of context. Then groups are about
actions which do not change context and which are reversible; monoids are about
actions which do not change context but which may be irreversible; and categories
are about actions which may change context and which may be irreversible. While
groups and monoids are said to have elements, the elements in a category (the elements
of Mat´ˆ´ in the above case) are usually called morphisms.
Note that although our definition of category looks very much tuned to matrices,
it is actually quite general. When someone speaks of a category, they mean nothing
more than an establishment of the structures and rules shown in (0)–(3) above.
2.5. The group-enriched category of matrix arithmetic. We still have not
grappled with the fact that matrices can be added. For every pair of natural num-
bers m, n P N the set Matmˆn can be given the structure of a group, which encodes
the addition of m ˆ n matrices. It is a different group than the one discussed in
Section 2.2—i.e., it encodes addition rather than multiplication—but it is a group
nonetheless because it satisfies the same formal rules. That is:
3 By N-category, I mean a category with a position, or object, for every natural number n P N. For
the definition of a general category, first add the following rule before the listed three:
(0) There is an established set Ob, whose elements are called objects.
Then, replace every occurrence of N with an occurrence of Ob. In other words, an N-category is a
category in which Ob “ N. In the standard definition of a category, Matmˆn is playing the role of
the set of morphisms m Ñ n.
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(1) There is an established addition formula for Matmˆn. In other words, every
two elements M, N P Matmˆn can be added, and the result is again in the
group, i.e., M ` N P Matmˆn.
(2) Adding is associative: for any M, N, P P Matmˆn, we have pM ` Nq ` P “
M ` pN ` P q.
(3) There is an established (additive) identity element in Matmˆn. In other words,
there is an element Zm,n P Matmˆn, such that Zm,n ` M “ M “ M ` Zm,n
for every M P Matmˆn.
(4) There is an established (additive) inverse operation in Matmˆn. In other
words, for every element M , there is an established element N , often denoted
N “ ´M , such that M `N “ Zn “ N ` M .
Of course, Zm,n is the m ˆ n matrix of zeros, and ´M is the matrix obtained by
multiplying each entry in M by ´1. We saw in Section 2.4 that Mat´ˆ´ is a category;
once we include the additive group structure on Matmˆn, our structure becomes a
group-enriched category.
Thus we see two types of group structures arising in the story of matrix arithmetic:
a group encoding matrix addition for m ˆ n matrices, for any m, n P N, and a group
encoding matrix multiplication for invertible n ˆ n matrices, for any n P N. And
there is further interaction between the additive and multiplicative operations in the
category of matrices; namely, multiplication of matrices distributes over addition in
the sense that MpN ` P q “ MN ` MP .
The entire addition and multiplication story for matrices, discussed above and in
any first course on linear algebra, is subsumed in a single category-theoretic statement:
Matrices form a group-enriched category with objects Ob “ N. This articulates:
‚ the dimensionality requirements for multiplication and addition,
‚ the roles of each identity and zero matrix,
‚ the associativity and distributivity laws for multiplication and addition,
‚ the existence of additive inverses,
‚ the way invertible matrices fit into the picture.
Let us clarify the final point. From the perspective that matrices form a category,
the notion of invertible matrices comes for free. That is, for every category C, and for
every object n in it, there is a group of invertible morphisms from n to itself, called
the automorphism group of n. When C is the category Mat´ˆ´, in which each object
is a natural number n P N, the automorphism group of n is InvMatn. Invertibility
is seen as an issue, not about matrices in particular, but about morphisms in any
category, and hence the issue is placed in a much broader context.
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3. Modeling linearity
In Section 2 we showed how category theory models the subject of matrix arith-
metic. But matrices themselves are one aspect of a highly-valued mathematical mod-
eling framework, namely that of vector spaces. Vector spaces are the mathematical
model of linearity, as we will discuss in Section 3.1. The category of vector spaces,
VectR, models this model by foregrounding the sense in which each vector space is
known by its relationship with other vector spaces. We will discuss this in Section 3.2.
3.1. Vector spaces: the mathematical models of linearity. The notion of lin-
earity shows up in our visual, linguistic, and cognitive interactions with the world.
Indeed our visual system is hardwired to highlight straight lines. In our language,
simplicity and goodness are often equated with flatness and straightness; English
words such as plain, straightforward, right, direct, correct and true invoke straight-
ness. And linearity also appears to be inherent in our best scientific understanding
of the physical universe. For example, general relativity postulates that the universe
is locally linearizable (i.e., that close enough to any point, the curved space of the
universe can be laid flat), and the predictions founded on that assumption match as-
toundingly with experiments. Even in mathematics we find that linearity often goes
hand in hand with simplicity, where many of our most successful techniques work by
reducing a difficult case to a linear one.
As may by now be clear, when I speak of linearity I am referring not only to lines,
but to the general notion of flatness, e.g., to planes and higher-dimensional flat spaces.
Unlike in curved spaces, such as soap bubbles, we find that in flat spaces a line can
point in any direction without having to curve. In the cases mentioned above, the
flat spaces also include a distinguished point, called the origin, and the straight line
segment from the origin to any other point is called a vector. Vectors can be stretched
by any scaling factor, and two vectors can be added together; in either case the result
is another vector. In mathematics, this kind of abstract flat space is called a vector
space.
But what are these vector spaces, and what are their relation with linearity in our
visual perception, our language, and our cognition? The relationship here is that
vector spaces are valuable models of our notions of linearity and flatness. That is,
(1) Vector spaces foreground and formalize certain observed aspects of linearity
and relationships between them.
(2) Our visual, linguistic, and cognitive interactions with linearity are successfully
mediated by the vector space model.
(3) Vector spaces are known by the relationships between them.
Let’s begin by considering the observable aspects of linearity. Newton’s first law of
motion is that the velocity of any object remains constant unless a force is applied to
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the object. In other words, time acts as a scalar multiplier for the motion of objects:
doubling the time doubles the distance traveled but does not alter the direction.
Scalar multiplication is at the heart of our notion of linearity: a line is the set of
scalar multiples of a given vector.
But what about higher-dimensional linear spaces? In his thought experiments
about motion, Galileo imagined a flat plane on which objects could move unob-
structed. A plane can be imagined as a 2-dimensional analogue of a line; it is in
some sense the simplest 2-dimensional space. A plane has enough structure to dis-
cuss not just distance but also direction. Both the angle between lines in a plane and
the degree of inclination of a plane embedded in space were necessary for the laws of
motion Galileo wished to discuss.
There are other aspects to planes and flat spaces that are important in modeling.
Namely, in a flat space, the different directions do not interact. That is, moving
forward in x does not cause any change to occur in y (compare with a parabola or
sphere). An n-dimensional vector space is a space in which there are n degrees of
freedom, which do not interact with one another. That is, there is a well-defined
notion of coordinate system, whereby every point in the space is uniquely determined
by n numbers. This does not hold on a sphere: while it is the case that every
point is determined by its latitude and longitude plat, longq, this determination is not
unique. For example, we have p90˝, long1q “ p90
˝, long2q for every pair of longitudes
long1, long2. In other words, the coordinates of latitude and longitude are not free
from one another; they interact at the north and south poles. This issue may seem
unimportant, but the point is that such caveats cannot be rectified on the sphere
precisely because it is not flat.
As mentioned above, the established mathematical models of flat spaces are vector
spaces. A (real) vector space is a collection of vectors, including a vector of length 0,
such that each vector can be scaled by any real number, e.g., doubled or tripled in
length, and such that any two vectors can be added together to form a new vector.
When made precise, these ideas are sufficient to define a coordinate system, or basis,
which is a minimal set of vectors that span the whole space. For example, if the basis
consists of three vectors, x, y, z, then every vector v in the space can be uniquely
obtained by adding together scalar multiples of the basis vectors, say v “ 4x ` 3y ´
1.5z.
Thus the observable aspects of linear spaces foregrounded by the mathematical
model of vector spaces are:
‚ the existence of a zero vector,
‚ scalar multiplication of vectors, and
‚ addition of vectors.
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These aspects and the relationships between them—e.g. commutativity of addition,
distributivity of scalar multiplication, existence of additive inverses, etc.—are pre-
cisely the content of the formal definition of vector space.4
Rene´ Descartes (and simultaneously Pierre de Fermat) developed the notion of
axes, whose coordinates specify any point in a plane (or 3D space). So coordinate
systems were invented long before the abstract notion of vector spaces was. However,
a major contribution of vector spaces is that they formalize the ability to change
between coordinate systems, e.g. by scaling or adding axes to form new axes. Since
one can change coordinates at will, perhaps one does not need them at all. In fact, the
vector space concept formalizes the idea, due to Lagrange, that the flat space exists,
and calculations can take place, a priori—without need for choosing coordinates.
Geometric considerations, such as how two intersecting lines span a plane and two
intersecting planes (in space) form a line, are all completely captured by the vector
space model. Moreover, various unexpected exceptions—such as the case where the
two intersecting planes happen to be the same (and hence the intersection is not a
line but the plane), or the case in which the two planes inhabit a space of more than
three dimensions and hence intersect in a point rather than a line—are exposed in
the mathematical model.
We have shown, then, that the vector space model of linearity successfully me-
diates our visual, linguistic, and cognitive interactions with flat spaces. We have
also discussed the system of relationships (commutativity, associativity, distributiv-
ity) between various aspects of linearity (zero, scalars, sums). This justifies our first
two postulates in this setting, so it remains to explain how vector spaces are known
by the relationships between them. It is the job of category theory, as a model, to
foreground this third postulate using morphisms. Thus we aim to show that vector
spaces (the models of linearity) are known by the morphisms between vector spaces.
Section 3.2 will kill two birds with one stone: it will show that the vector space
model of linearity satisfies the third postulate, and it will show that this satisfaction
of the third postulate is itself foregrounded by the category theoretic model VectR of
the vector space model of linearity.
3.2. VectR: the categorical model of vector spaces. Category theory formalizes
relationships as morphisms, and the tried-and-true morphisms between vector spaces
are called linear transformations, which we now recall. Let V and W be vector
spaces. A linear transformation f : V Ñ W is a method for converting vectors in
V to vectors in W . But f cannot be an arbitrary function: in order to be called
a linear transformation, it must preserve the structures we have formalized in our
model, namely zero, scalars, and sums. That is, it must satisfy
4Whenever we speak of vector spaces, we mean finite-dimensional vector spaces over the field R of
real numbers.
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‚ fp0q “ 0,
‚ fpr ¨ vq “ r ¨ fpvq, and
‚ fpv ` v1q “ fpvq ` fpv1q
for any v, v1 P V and r P R. In fact, there is a tight connection between the set of
linear transformations V Ñ W and the set Mat|V |ˆ|W | of |V | ˆ |W | matrices, where
|V |, |W | P N are the dimensions of V and W . Once one chooses a basis for V and
W , this connection becomes a one-to-one correspondence: each matrix represents a
single linear transformation. There is an equivalence between the category VectR and
the category Mat´ˆ´ described in Section 2.1; we will henceforth elide the difference.
The point so far is that the morphisms in the category VectR take seriously the
structures (zero, scalars, sums) we have formalized in each individual model of linear-
ity. In general, the morphisms in a category are designed to reflect (by preserving)
the structures that define each object. Thus, an object in a category is not only
(epistemologically) known by its relationships with other objects; it (ontologically) is
what it is by virtue of its relationships with other objects. In a categorical model, the
knowing of an object and the being of an object are essentially identical.
In the case of a vector space V , pure category theoretic reasoning only allows one
to consider those aspects of V that can be defined in terms of morphisms into or out
of it. For example, the most important aspect of a vector space is the notion of vector.
Any individual vector v P V defines a ruled line in V ; that is, all scalar multiples of
v lie on a single line, ruled by tick-marks at every integer multiple of v. But there
is a vector space that represents ruled line-hood itself, namely the one-dimensional
vector space R of all scalar multiples of 1. We can now say how the notion of vector is
itself defined in terms of morphisms in VectR: for any vector v P V there is a unique
morphism R Ñ V for which v is the image of the vector 1 P R. So if one wishes to
think categorically about vectors in a vector space, one can think only in terms of
morphisms in VectR, i.e., linear transformations.
In fact, the four notions of vector, zero-vector, scalar multiplication, and addition
of vectors can all be understood in terms of linear transformations, as we now explain.
First, as mentioned above, a vector in V is the same thing as a linear transformation
R Ñ V , so we have interpreted single vectors in terms only of morphisms. Second,
there is a unique morphism from the 0-dimensional vector space R0 to any vector
space V . There is also a unique morphism R Ñ R0, and the composite R Ñ R0 Ñ V
picks out the zero-vector in V . Third, scaling a vector v by a real number r P R can
be understood using only composition of morphisms. It fits beautifully to realize that
a scalar like r can be represented as a morphism, namely as the linear transformation
r : R Ñ R sending x ÞÑ rx. We already know that v is represented by a morphism
R Ñ V . The scaled vector, rv : R Ñ V is then simply the composite of two morphisms
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R
r
ÝÑ R
v
ÝÑ V in VectR. Fourth, there is an similarly elegant way to understand addition
of vectors in terms of morphisms.
The upshot is that the linear transformations between vector spaces can account for
all the formal structure that makes a vector space a vector space. But what about the
informal, cognitive aspects of linearity discussed in Section 3.1, namely ideas like lines,
line segments, inclined planes, projections, intersections, and coordinate systems? We
have seen that lines in V are captured by linear transformations R Ñ V , and similarly
the inclusion of an inclined plane in 3D space is a linear transformation R2 Ñ R3.
The projection of 3D space onto a line or plane is given by a linear transformation
R
3 Ñ R or R3 Ñ R2. Any given coordinate system on a vector space of dimension n
is given by a unique linear isomorphism Rn Ñ V . The notion of intersecting various
lines and planes are also beautifully and completely described by a kind of interplay
between morphisms, known as the pullback.
It is something of a miracle that so many of our intuitive ideas about vector spaces
are describable simply in terms of the morphisms in the category VectR. However,
to a category-theorist, this is routine. Every well-studied category has this property,
because this is precisely the observable aspect of modeling that category theory fore-
grounds. In other words, in order for a subject to be model-able by category theory,
its objects of study must be determined by their morphisms to and from other objects.
There is a general theorem by Nobuo Yoneda (called Yoneda’s lemma) to this effect:
any object c in any category C is essentially determined by the morphisms into (or
out of) c.
In other words, categories can only model “relationally-determined” subjects, sub-
jects in which each object of study is ontologically determined by its relationships
to the others. In this case, what is surprising is how extensive the reach of category
theory is. The fact that category theory is consistently used to describe so many parts
of mathematics, from topological spaces to groups to ordered sets to measure spaces,
means that all of these subjects are relationally-determined. This justifies our third
postulate, at least for these specific cases.
In the next section we define functors, which relate different categories like mor-
phisms relate objects. This will prepare us to discuss symmetry and action in Sec-
tion 5.
4. Relationships between high-level models
Throughout this paper, we have roughly been interpreting models and relation-
ships, in the context of category theory, as follows. Each object in a category is a
model. For example, each vector space is a model of linearity: R is a model of line-
hood, R2 is a model of plane-hood, etc. But each entire category is also a model, albeit
one of a higher level. For example, VectR is our model of linearity itself. Each low-level
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model (object) is defined by its relationships (morphisms) to other low-level models,
where these relationships are formalized in the higher-level model (the category). For
example, we showed how the linearity—the vector space-ness, as formalized by zero,
scalars, and sums—of each vector space V P VectR is defined in terms of morphisms
between V and other vector spaces.
But if low-level models are known by the relationships between them, it should
be that high-level models are as well. This is indeed the case. We now discuss the
categorical model of higher-level models, i.e., the category of categories.
4.1. Cat: the category of categories. There is a larger-sized category, denoted Cat,
which includes every normal-sized category as an object.5 If C and D are categories,
a morphism between them in Cat is called a functor, and can be denoted F : C Ñ D.
Just like any morphism, a functor is a relationship between two categories that
preserves the defining structure of categories. Recall from Section 2.4 that the defining
structure of a category C is a set of objects, a set of morphisms, an identity morphism
for each object, and a formula for composing morphisms. These satisfy some laws,
namely that composing any morphism g with an identity morphism gives back g and
that composition is associative. To say that functors preserve the structures that
define categories is shorthand for the following more formal statement. A functor
F : C Ñ D must
‚ assign to each object c P ObpCq an object F pcq P ObpDq,
‚ assign to each morphism g : c Ñ c1 in C a morphism F pgq : F pcq Ñ F pc1q in D,
‚ ensure that the morphism assigned to each identity in C is an identity in D,
i.e., for all c P ObpCq, a functor F must ensure that F pidcq “ idF pcq, and
‚ ensure that the composition formula in C is compatible with the composition
formula in D, i.e., F pg ˝C hq “ F pgq ˝D F phq.
There is a very basic category, which represents object-hood in Cat the way that R
represents ruled line-hood in VectR. Let O P ObpCatq denote the category with one
object, ObpOq “ t‚u; only one morphism, id‚ : ‚ Ñ ‚; and the composition formula
says id‚ ˝ id‚ “ id‚. This category O might be pictured
‚(2)
For any category C, the objects of C are the same as the functors O Ñ C. Similarly,
there is a category M, which might be pictured
‚ ÝÑ ‚(3)
5I apologize for the vagueness with respect to the size issue, but it is not relevant to our discussion.
See Shulman, “Set theory for category theory” for details.
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that represents morphism-hood in Cat. That is, for any category C, the morphisms
of C are the same as functors MÑ C. There is also a functor that represents identity
morphisms as well as a functor that represents composition formulas.
In other words, the morphisms in Cat can account for all the formal structure
that makes a category a category: objects, morphisms, identities, and compositions.
This justifies our third postulate in the case of categories: the structure of any given
category C is completely determined by the system of functors that map to it from
other categories.
4.2. Two justifications for the third postulate in general. Our goal has been
to show that category theory is a mathematical model of mathematical modeling. We
discussed the rough meaning of this statement by introducing three postulates about
modeling in Section 1, and we said that category theory foregrounds and formalizes
the third: that each model is known by its relationships with other models. We have
also justified this postulate in several cases; we now justify it in general.
In a single category, Yoneda’s lemma offers one explication and formal justification
of the third postulate, given the interpretation of models and relationships, laid out in
the first paragraph of Section 4. However, any functor between two categories provides
another way to relate these high-level models, namely by something reminiscent of
analogy. That is, if F : C Ñ D is a functor, it relates each object c P ObpCq with an
object F pcq P ObpDq. The morphisms between c and its neighbors in C are preserved
by F , which makes F act as a sort of analogy, as observed by Brown and Porter.6 Our
third postulate was intended as a ordinary-language hybrid of the Yoneda concept
and the functorial analogy concept.
We now return to a few of the most important areas of mathematical modeling in
the usual sense: symmetry and dynamics. The Yoneda interpretation of our third
postulate is always at work, but we will briefly explore the second interpretation: how
high-level analogies bring out the features of a subject.
5. Symmetry and action
Consider the reflective symmetry of the visible human body or the rotational sym-
metry of Escher’s Drawing Hands. The question of symmetry is about reversible
action-ability, e.g., the ability to reflect an object and the ability to rotate an object
by 180˝ are both reversible. To say that an object is symmetrical with respect to
an act is to say that it does not change when it undergoes this act; e.g., the visible
human body is unchanged as it undergoes mirror reflection and Drawing Hands is
unchanged as it undergoes 180˝ rotation.
6See Brown, R.; Porter, T. Category theory: an abstract setting for analogy and comparison,
http://pages.bangor.ac.uk/˜mas010/pdffiles/Analogy-and-Comparison.pdf, whose aim is sim-
ilar to, but whose scope is more ambitious than, the present paper.
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We begin in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 by considering various questions of symmetry
and action-abilities in the above sense, but this is mainly to set up our main point.
Namely, a group G of symmetries (reversible action-abilities) exists independently of
any thing that is so-symmetrical (unchanged under corresponding actions). But then
what is the connection of the symmetry to the symmetrical? It is captured simply
by a functorial connection between one category and another, namely the reversible
action category G and the space category VectR. The functorial connection between a
category like G7 and another category C is called an action of G on an object of C. We
will study actions in Section 5.3. Finally in Section 5.4, we will consider dynamical
systems, which are classical exemplars of mathematical modeling, and which again
are nothing but functorial connections (roughly, between a time category and a space
category).
5.1. Modeling reversible action-ability with groups. A square S, with unit-
length sides, centered at the origin in R2 is symmetrical with respect to eight action-
abilities: it can be rotated and reflected in any combination:
Do nothing
Square
C
A
D
B
Rotate 90˝
S
q
u
ar
e
A
B
C
D
Rotate 180˝
Square
B
D
A
C
Rotate 270˝
S
q
u
are
D
C
B
A
(4)
Vertical flip
Square
A
C
B
D
90˝ & Flip
S
q
u
are
B
A
D
C
180˝ & Flip
Square
D
B
C
A
270˝ & Flip
S
q
u
ar
e
C
D
A
B
Neither the word Square, the gray dot, nor the labels A, B, C, D are symmetrical with
respect to the same eight-element group that the square itself is. They are drawn in
(4) to show that unlike the square, they undergo change when we act on them in
these eight ways.
Every one of these eight actions on the square is reversible, and its reverse is another
one of the eight actions. The actions are also serializable, in the sense that if each of
a1, . . . , an is one of the eight, then so is the process obtained by doing them in series,
denoted a1a2 ¨ ¨ ¨ an. In Section 2.2 we called this serialization multiplication, but in
category-theoretic terms it is called composition. The above eight-element set, which
has an identity element and is closed under inverses and compositions, is a group (see
Section 2.2), called the dihedral group of order 8, and denoted D8.
7By the phrase “a category like G”, we mean a category with one object; see Section 5.1.
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Note that the group D8 acts on the square, but in fact D8 exists independently of
the square. That is, D8 could just as well act on an octagon or on a single point at the
origin. We refer to the elements of D8 as action-abilities because each is able to act
on a variety of things. The elements only become actions when they are applied to
something, such as a square. We will discuss the notion of action itself in Section 5.3.
Every group can be modeled as a category G with many morphisms, each corre-
sponding to an action-ability, but with only one object. The unique object of G stands
for “the abstract thing that is unchanged under these actions.” The identity morphism
corresponds to the ability not to act, and the composition formula in G corresponds to
the requirement that the serialization of action-abilities is an action-ability. Groups
are categories that encode symmetries, which we define as action-abilities that can
be undone. That is, for every morphism a P G, there is a morphism b for which the
serializations a-then-b and b-then-a are equal to the identity (non-)action.
The group D8 is one type of symmetry; there are many others. For example,
consider the line that goes through the origin in R2 at an angle of 30˝. If you take
each point on the line and multiply its distance from the origin by a non-zero number
k, but do not change the angle, the total result is again the same 30˝ line: it is
unchanged by non-zero scaling. Thus there is a different group, R‰0, of non-zero
scaling abilities. It is a different type of symmetry than D8, but just as much able to
encode a kind of ability to act reversibly.
Before we move on, note that we now know that each group is a category. A functor
between two groups is called a group homomorphism. The category of all groups and
group homomorphisms, denoted Grp, is the high-level model of symmetry itself, just
like the category VectR is the high-level model of linearity.
5.2. Modeling action-ability with monoids. As mentioned in Section 2.3, a
monoid is like a group, except that not all its elements need be invertible. For
example, there is a monoid M consisting of four action-abilities, which we can depict
using their action on a windowpane.
I=Do nothing
C
A
D
B
V =Vertical Crush
AC BD
H=Horizontal crush
AB
CD
T=Total crush
ABCD
Any sequence of these action-abilities can be serialized, and the result is also one
of these four action-abilities. Also, there is an identity, “do nothing” action-ability.
Thus we have a monoid, and it is not a group because three of the action-abilities are
irreversible. Each element of M acts on the windowpane: it sends every point in the
windowpane to another point in the windowpane.
CATEGORIES AS MATHEMATICAL MODELS 19
A monoid is a category with one object, but with possibly many morphisms from
that object to itself, as depicted here:
‚

RR(5)
The fact that there is only one object means that any two morphisms can be composed;
this is the serializability.
In passing we note that the connection between groups and monoids (every group
is a monoid but not vice versa) is captured by a high-level analogy, i.e. a functor
Grp Ñ Mon, where Mon is the category of all monoids. There are even functors going
the other way, Mon Ñ Grp, but we will not discuss any of them here.
5.3. Modeling action with outgoing functors. The four elements of the monoid
M from the previous section (5.2) can be represented by the following matrices:
I ÞÑ
„
1 0
0 1

V ÞÑ
„
1 0
0 0

H ÞÑ
„
0 0
0 1

T ÞÑ
„
0 0
0 0

(6)
But how exactly can we enunciate this connection between elements of our monoid
M and these matrices, i.e., morphisms in VectR.
The most concise and straightforward way I know is to use functors. A functor
F : M Ñ VectR assigns to each object in M an object in VectR. Since there is only one
object in M , we get only one vector space; in the above case, it is R2. A functor F also
assigns to each morphism in M a morphism in VectR; the four elements tI, V, H, T u
of the monoid are then sent to four linear transformations R2 Ñ R2. These are
represented by the four matrices above in (6). Moreover, the composition formula for
M is preserved by F . This ensures that if an equation holds in M , e.g., V H “ T ,
then the corresponding equation holds in VectR, e.g.,„
1 0
0 0
 „
0 0
0 1

“
„
0 0
0 0

In mathematics, if M is a monoid (or a group), we define an M -action on a set
to be a functor M Ñ Set; we define an M -action on a vector space to be a functor
M Ñ VectR; and so on. Thus in (6) we have established an M -action on R
2. Similarly,
the group InvMatn of invertible n ˆ n matrices, discussed in Section 2.2 acts on R
n.
The study of functors from a group to VectR is often called representation theory in
mathematics.
There is a natural category structure on the class of functors between any two
categories. These functor categories are often important, as they are in representation
theory. In the next section we briefly describe dynamical systems in these terms.
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5.4. Dynamical systems. To model the behavior of a system that changes in time,
one must decide whether to formalize its change as continuous or discrete. For exam-
ple, the internal states of a computer may be best modeled with a discrete dynamical
system, if it has an internal clock that dictates discrete times at which changes can
occur. On the other hand, the concentrations of chemicals in a reaction process are
changing continuously, so the reaction is often modeled by a continuous dynamical
system. Here we will focus on autonomous dynamical systems.
A discrete dynamical system is defined to be a set S and a where-to-go-next function
f : S Ñ S. A case where S has eleven elements may be depicted
‚ // ‚
%%❑❑
❑❑
‚
%%❑❑
❑❑
‚
yysss
s
‚oo ‚
yysss
s
‚oo
‚

‚

‚
ee❑❑❑❑
‚
ZZ
In fact a discrete dynamical system is the same thing as a functor N Ñ Set, where
N is the monoid of natural numbers under addition. In other words, consider N as a
one-object category with morphisms 0, 1, 2, . . ., where composing i with j is given by
the formula i ` j. A functor N Ñ Set consists of a set S and a function fn : S Ñ S
for every natural number n. The fact that a functor must preserve the composition
formula implies that f ipf jpsqq “ f i`jpsq for every s P S.
A continuous dynamical system (sometimes called a flow) is a topological space S
and a continuous function f : S ˆ Rě0 Ñ S, such that
fps, 0q “ s and fpfps, t1q, t2q “ fps, t1 ` t2q.
Here fps, 3.14q would tell us where the point s will be after 3.14 units of time. In fact, a
continuous dynamical system can be modeled categorically as a topologically-enriched
functor Rě0 Ñ Top. The reader is not expected to understand this statement exactly,
but the idea is that we can concisely capture the definition of dynamical systems using
functors.
We have now shown that the class of dynamical systems (either discrete or contin-
uous) is itself a category of functors from a time category to a space category. For
discrete dynamical systems, time and space are modeled discretely (with time as N
and space as a set). For continuous dynamical systems, they are modeled continu-
ously (with time as Rě0 and space as a topological space). However, the dynamical
system itself is a functor between these categories.
Time and space can be modeled as independent categories, but part of the human
concept of time is that it acts on objects in space. That is, we understand our model
of time and our model of space by connecting the two. This is an example of the
analogical interpretation of the third postulate, and we have modeled it formally in
this section using functors.
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6. Conclusion
Karl Popper said, “A theory that explains everything, explains nothing.” If category
theory models algebra, geometry, logic, computer science, probability, and more, is it
not trying to be a model of everything? The point is a bit subtle.
Category theory is not a theory of everything. It is more like, as topologist Jack
Morava put it,8 “a theory of theories of anything”. In other words, it is a model of
models. It leaves each subject alone to solve its own problems, to sharpen and refine its
toolset in the ways it sees fit. That is, CT does not micromanage in the affairs of any
discipline. However, describing any discipline categorically tends to bring increased
conceptual clarity, because conceptual clarity is CT’s main concern, its domain of
expertise. And it does enforce certain principles; for example the theorem of Yoneda,
discussed above, ensures that it is not the objects, but rather the relationships between
objects, that determine the essence of any category. Finally, category theory allows
one to compare different models, thus carrying knowledge from one domain to another,
as long as one can construct the appropriate “analogy”, i.e., functor.
Category theory has continually sharpened and refined its own toolset, i.e., its
ability to articulate the various objects, relationships, properties, structures, and
methods that show up throughout mathematics. It consistently shows itself as a
powerful mode of mathematical thinking, and there is no a priori reason it cannot be
similarly successful in science more broadly.
However, a question remains: what of the modeler? Who is the one that decides
that a certain category adequately models a certain subject? Who is the one that
finds value in the category-theoretic mode of thought? Perhaps category theory can
aid in a mathematically rigorous form of phenomenological reduction,9 in which the
process of thinking is itself elucidated. Category theory could be considered a truly
profound model of modeling if it could model the cognitive apparatus itself, i.e., if it
could foreground and mathematically communicate the relationship between subject,
model, and modeler.
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